Entries from February 2009 ↓

NPR’s “All Things Considered” aired a Radio Diary tonight about Rose McCoy, a member of New York’s “Brill Building” pop songwriting cabal of the 1950s and 60s. McCoy came to New York at the age of 19 with six bucks in her pocket and went on to have an incredibly prolific songwriting career.

The songwriting environment of that square block in New York was a hotbed of collaboration.

After work, many of the employees would gather at a restaurant around the corner, called Beefsteak Charlie’s. Soul singer Maxine Brown remembers that it was like a music marketplace.

“The place was hoppin’,” Brown says. “Writers, they would run over and pitch their songs. Just right there on the spot, start singing it. And the verse would be on a napkin, and he’d reach in his pocket and the bridge could be on a brown piece of paper bag … [A] lot of the songs that you heard back in the old days were sold right out of that restaurant.”

McCoy had teamed up with a songwriting partner, Charlie Singleton. They set up their office in a booth at Beefsteak Charlie’s.

“We’d write back there,” McCoy says. “People got to know us so well, they used take our telephone calls. We’d meet there every morning, 6 o’clock, and buy a little glass of wine for 30 cents, and we’d sip on that.

You can’t help but connect that to the entrepreneurial activity taking place in your average Starbucks today.

Hell, they even invented an entire company dedicated to bringing beggars (that would be guys like us who want money) and funding sources together on every street corner in America — STARBUCKS!

I am willing to bet that more deals are getting done at Starbucks than ever got done on the fairways, greens and tee boxes of the old boy network. Even at $4 for a freakin’ latte, it’s cheaper plus no sunburn.

—JLM (Jeff), via Howard Lindzon, via Fred Wilson

Collaboration, riffing, working together to create the perfect song, the perfect pitch, the next hit, the next killer app.

As the mid-60s approached, so did change:

The 1950s and early ’60s were the heyday of the professional songwriter in pop music. But in 1964, the music scene was about to change. That year, The Beatles had five of the 10 biggest songs on the Billboard charts. One was a cover of “Twist and Shout,” but the rest were their own songs.

“People like Bob Dylan, et cetera, start emerging [and] perform their own songs,” Bell says. “So they got recognition as a singer, but also a great writer. And literally I saw our industry, for want of a better way to put it, kick the songwriter to the curb, [and] Rose was just another songwriter.”

“When the singers find out they can write for themselves,” McCoy says, “they didn’t want to see your song. They wanted to write their own songs.”

As a result, the Brill Building songwriters had to find new ways to make a living. Carole King and Neil Diamond launched successful singing careers. Some became producers, while others left the music business.

Earlier in the day, I watched the Zapurder-esque video of Gary Vaynerchuk’s FOWA 2009 keynote speech:

Gary hits on a number of themes:

• “Twitter is not a marketing plan.”
• “Do what you love. Love your damn family and crush it.”
• “The people willing to get obnoxiously dirty are going to win.”

But the core theme he drove home was that the content producers no longer need the intermediaries. Kanye doesn’t need Apple, he could do everything he does from kanyewest.com. The democratization of technology and of distribution means that talent wins out in the end for those willing to get dirty and “crush it”.

What Vaynerchuk, Dylan and Diamond Have in Common

Yet in thinking over these two pieces today, I’m struck by the contradiction in Gary’s message. He’s obviously crushing it, speaking all over the country, pumping out Wine Library TV episodes like a maniac. If you’re a lone democratized voice creating content, do you see the parallel to the Brill Building era? It’s not just being a brilliant content creator, just as it wasn’t enough after the Beatles arrived to simply be a brilliant and prolific songwriter. The ones who made the leap and survived were the songwriters—the Dylans and the Neil Diamonds—who got dirty, crushed it and amplified their skill set to adapt to a new environment.

The logical conclusion then, as it appears to be now, is to learn how to perform their own content. To become not just a content creator, but the performance artist. Alignment of passion.

There are no doubt wine store owners and liquor store owners as passionate about their work as Gary, who could create content and ideas just as good, but without that passion to work hard and put themselves out there to perform, you’ll never hear of them. Vaynerchuk is the ultimate performer of his own content—no one else could pull it off or amplify it any better than he can. You can’t perform a “cover” of an impassioned Vaynerchuk rant. Content and performer and performance are inseparable.

If you’re creating brilliant content, and you want it heard, you have to become the brand. Maybe it takes getting into fisticuffs with a hated rival. Maybe you have to speak at 300 dates a year. Maybe you have to have the shameless knack for self-promotion. Whatever it takes.

Content is just the start. Focus on building value and intellectual capital first, but realize that at some point you’re going to have to create the social capital, and then turn that social capital into flat out live performances. Keep this in mind when you have heady thoughts about democratization of voices, and the rise of the masses.

Rose McCoy is 86 now, living in Teaneck, NJ, about 25 miles away from Gary Vaynerchuk’s wine store. No word if she’s a Jets fan, but if anyone has the passion to turn her into one, it’s Gary.

This week was mixed, marked primarily by a desire to get smaller. I started the week by closing a couple of bad long positions I had entered the week before while anticipating a bigger rally, and ended the week covering a ton of successful shorts. I’ll start with the bad, end with the good.

Rhymes with Ass and Ack

Tuesday I closed out two of my failed trades. The week before I bought FAS and Bank of America BAC May 10 calls as long insurance against my massive shorts, playing the news cycle. What I failed to pick up early enough was the depth of the outright hostility there was to the bailout news of the last couple of weeks. FAS ended up being a 38% loss; BAC a 52% loss. With the discipline of small position sizes, this hurt, but not fatally as it might have hurt later last year when I was routinely taking positions 4-5x the size I should. The silver lining is that I acted decisively Tuesday morning and avoided further huge losses. As someone still saddled with a buy and hold mindset, this was a bit of a breakthrough to actually cut and run when the tape was so clearly against me.

In examining this, there were several problems, and several points of hope. First problem: the initial idea was wrong. I had seen several times that Congressional action had temporarily revived an industry, but this time it was different; the looming threat of nationalization gave no bounce. Second problem: execution of the idea. Rather than go into something broad (like the FAS), I traded too much. I had to hope that there was a secret surprise in there for BAC. That’s just gambling. I would have been better off trying to ride FAS up alone. Complexity kills. Finally, had I maintained some discipline around stops, I could have saved some of the BAC loss. What started as a quick trade (averaging down too early) turned into a longer duration trade, and I was adrift. Proven wrong, I at least acted decisively when it was clear I was wrong.

Conviction Closed

One of my long underwater put positions, US Steel (X), finally got back above water, and I quickly pulled the trigger, selling all calls for a 21% gain. All the profit came from the puts I bought when I averaged down. Had I waited another couple of days, I could have increased this gain to around 35%, but I was happy to salvage the bad initial buy at the transaction cost.

The lesson I learned from this one is that there are different classes of people I follow on StockTwits. There are those who generate good trend ideas but whom I may not want to treat as signals for entry points (e.g., BuyOnTheDip on this X call, although he falls into the next category on a few of his recommendations.) There are those who generate ideas and make their entry and exit criteria clear from an intraday perspective (e.g., UpsideTrader and Mandelbrot at TwitterReality and fortune8 who uses a more Socratic method—complete with reinforcing visual aids of what a double bottom looks like—of teaching the method behind his entries and exits). And there are those who also make the most sense to listen to if you’re at your computer while the market’s open—again, UpsideTrader is one of the best.

So one of the new elements for my trading and following checklist is to classify the source of the ideas based on these characteristics; is the idea recognition of a trend that just hasn’t taken hold yet, or does it come with a source who gives a clear idea of when to get in or out?

Getting Clean on Tech

My other goal for the week was to close out my tech put positions as they moved into profitability. After spending a long time in the stratosphere (relative to where I thought it would be after the Steve Jobs announcement), Apple (AAPL) came back down to earth, and I eased out of those puts over two days for an overall 8.5% gain. Palm, which I had also averaged down on, went out Thursday for a 18% gain. These exits seemed to work out okay; both recovered Friday, so I might have been able to get a better day trade price, I’m happy to be sitting with the cash now.

Back into INTC

I’ve been watching INTC for some time. $14 a share didn’t seem sustainable, but $12.75 didn’t seem fair on the downside either. With an RSI below 30, it seems way oversold, so I finally bought some July 17 calls Thursday. The technicals don’t look that strong, and I may buy some more if they strengthen, but my goal with these small trades is to be satisfied with 10-15% gains.

The main reason I’m in it, and why I dumped my tech puts, is that from the last few weeks, tech has been surprisingly resilient in the face of all the bad news. Not quite immune, but poised to lead us out of this mess. I want to have a few quality longs in this space, since I see them as bellwethers and ways to profit quickly on any false bear rallies.

Tried My First Twitter Reality Recommendation

Picked the wrong one, but after seeing Mandelbrot’s record related to story stocks, I tried one experimental trade by buying AMED with a bid below the expected open on Thursday, catching it at 49, but getting out Friday at 48.60. In the past, I might have held this longer, but the conditions for those story stock trades is to get in and out on the same day, so I didn’t have any reason to hold longer than the extra morning. I may try this again, but only when I see futures being up and the stock recommendation hitting something I’m more familiar with.

SRS: Botched, or Not?

My cost basis on SRS is around $86; I’ve been selling premium on it for some time, and watched with glee as it climbed slowly back into the 80s. When it was in the 50s, I had sold some Feb $86 call premium at a fair price, thinking that if I got taken out, I’d at least have a couple of months of premium in exchange for the trade. On expiration day, SRS stood at around $82, and I considered buying back the calls to close to keep the shares. In retrospect, the right move might have been to buy back the premium and dump the shares entirely, since it closed at $72. I still haven’t decided yet whether to just write this one off, write some more premium, or let it play out as commercial real estate hits further pain points over the course of the year. Psychologically, I feel the need to make a profit. Classic irrationality. The shares are up 40% over the last couple of weeks; they make no sense to carry overnight at any time. Yet I keep doing it, rationalizing it by selling insane premium and bringing down my cost basis. There has to be a name for that. Reverse Martingale?

And the Big Winner: FAZ

As part of my foray into the financials, I started out with a buy of FAZ at $45 on February 6. Thursday it climbed to the $70s and I decided to take the money and run, selling at $71 for a 13-day, 57% win. Had I waited another day, I might have sold it at $81. The weird thing is that it must have sold after hours on Thursday—looking at Google Finance, it appears that it never really got to $71 during the day. Given that it closed after hours Friday at 70.99, I consider the exit okay. It could have just as easily gapped down Friday as up.

Who I Started Following this Week

I started following Michael Lazerow this week; I really enjoy his blog.

I’m dumping Google for Amazon in a couple of ways, and here’s why:

For the past year or so, I’ve had a Google AdSense block over there to the right. Not because I had illusions of making any money, but to get a sense for how it worked, and what typical click-through rates are on a personal blog. As the focus on my posts moved away from the Code and Literature of the blog’s tag line, and more to Money, the ads settled in on a bunch of penny stock pushers. No one clicked on anything anyway, and in the course of the experiment, I netted little more than a postage stamp’s worth of value.

Consequently, I’ve dumped the AdSense in the sidebar and limited my commercialization to book recommendations. For my kind of site, I think this works a lot better. And my decision to do so tells you something about the two companies.

Fat Head Aggregators vs the Filtered Long Tail

Currently I’m reading Howard Lindzon’s new book, The Wallstrip Edge (full review later, when I finish). I’m about 1/3rd of the way through the book, just past the part where he describes experiences in finding trends. And the trend I see here is not only relevant to monetization of blogs, but to the underlying stocks as well.

Google is great for monetizing commercial eyeballs. AdSense works not for the long tail, but for the “fat head” aggregators and ad farmers who can pull in 1M page views per month, or really narrow their focus to attracting search traffic on a topic rather than building an audience. Facebook’s click through rates, which are reported to be notoriously low (in the 0.04% range), in fact may be more typical than anyone wants to admit. Like so many of the faith-based schemes that have been exposed in the last year, AdSense profitability and conversion ratios seem to be overstated. Not good for the GOOG. A thesis I’m working on for a later post is that you can find things that are “too good to be true” and profit by avoiding them. As the web matures, I suspect that the AdSense ecosystem, which for much of the decade was too good to be true, will grow far less attractive monetization option.

Amazon, on the other hand, caters better to the long tail, to those finding trusted voices, and to those building audiences.

The trend I see (confirmed by observing the many-to-many relationships on Twitter, and by the dynamics of StockTwits as it relates to trend following is that repeated interactions lead to trust, and so much commerce—finding things, finding what you should be interested in, learning what’s best—are enabled and made more effective by the social filter. The actions taken due to these recommendations results in real commerce taking place; a “real” transaction occurs as opposed to a trivial payment for shifting attention.

Trust the Filter; Monetize the Trust

It’s no wonder that a trend rider like Howard is investing in StockTwits and Amazon; it’s a coherent theory that makes sense. Trust the filter; monetize the trust.

So I’m avoiding Google and looking to buy Amazon. Put another way (inspired by a line in Howard’s book), I’m more confident that Amazon is the next Amazon than I am that Google is the next Google.

In the interest of full disclosure, I have to cover my bad trades as well as my good. Anyone can crow about their winners. Here’s the anatomy of yet another bad set of trades I closed out today.

At the end of the first week of February, I went long FAZ at $45. At this point I’d been piling up shorts into the rally and the ever-declining FAZ seemed to be ripe for a turnaround. After holding over the weekend and watching the futures turn up in anticipation of the stimulus package, I got nervous and decided I needed to hedge long. As FAZ dropped to about $40 last Monday, I actually went long FAS and bought some BAC May $10 calls. The lame motivation there was that I expected some extreme daily volatility that would end with the financials continue their rise up, so the byzantine logic was that I’d have a chance to kick a FAZ rally as doubt rose, then cash in on the rebound when the stimulus details came out. I couldn’t day trade during this period, so the complexity came from trying to lock in trades with limit buys

The flaws (more like a comedy of errors) are compounded: being long and short at the same time with vehicles you shouldn’t carry overnight, buying derivatives on a broken bank, adding complexity and too many moving parts to a theory that could have been greatly simplified had I picked a single trade that was likely to work, believing that there might be something in the plan that the market would like. Traders talk a lot about “context” and the context that helped make me stupid here was that I was way short and the bulls were making noise like this could be a significant run that I had to hedge. Just got on tilt.

So BAC fell, as did FAS. The 11% loss in FAZ that I had when I added FAS was effectively baked in with the hedge, but as the week went on, the ETF sawtooth effect compounded the problems. Rather than save face immediately and admit the bad trades, I tried a couple of times to sell premium on both FAZ and FAS (out of the money) but didn’t get my ask. After averaging down a little bit on BAC, I gave up and spent the weekend analyzing my trades from the last five months.

I learned that while my winners outnumbered losers by almost 3:1, the average loss for a loser was about 33% greater than the win on a winner. Since I give a lot more play due to the volatility of the last several months, it didn’t totally surprise me, as I had a couple of big losers. Rather than set tight stops (which I may eventually come to—since it’s the conventional wisdom), I do need to execute a lot more discipline and cut my losers earlier.

Today I followed through. With the futures down big before trading, I tried to dump my FAS pre-market (not recommended) but only got out when the market opened at $6.79, saving another 11% in downturn over the $6 close (but locking in a painful 36.7% loss overall). I dropped the BAC calls next, dumped for a painful 50% loss. FAZ rose 24% today (and is up 50% from when I bought the FAS), so I’ve worked through the FAS loss and started in on the BAC loss.

Tomorrow (Wednesday), if we’re down, I’m looking to cover my tech puts (PALM and AAPL) and buy some INTC calls (RSI is really, really low, so looking to wait until the stock is in the $12s again), but let my other puts run (NDAQ, X, MA, BBY). As I type, the futures are up, so I may have to start plotting revenge for later in the week.

At the suggestion of @sorenmacbeth, I changed the tag line on these posts to reflect the real purpose—how an otherwise inexperienced retail investor can use StockTwits to make money. (Besides, I’ve maxed out the Google juice for the phrase “idiot retail investor”; maybe that’ll come in handy in the next retail investor bubble.)

This week’s trading didn’t turn out all that well, so I’ll cover that quickly and then dive into two other topics that I’ve been pondering: how I trade, and the whether averaging down works for me or not.

This Week In Failball

Going into this week I was way short, so I tried to get long financials prior to the stimulus hijinks. Unfortunately, that didn’t work out; my position in FAS was creamed (down about 30%), and my BAC calls are still underwater by about 30% even after averaging down. I also averaged down on both Best Buy (BBY) and Palm, two trades I expect to pay off well. I tried salvaging things on the financials by selling some premium, but was a day too late to get off some call premium on FAS and FAZ.

I’m still working on ideas for next week. My hold portfolio is all long (except for about 25% cash) so a bear rally next week doesn’t hurt too much, although there’s no denying that I was on the wrong side of a lot of financials this week.

The pain is no fun to talk about right now; I’m in denial. Let’s get to the good stuff.

How I Trade

I’ve mentioned before that the demands of my real job make it nearly impossible to day trade of follow the market on a daily basis. I tend to swing trade over the course of a few days or a few weeks, and sometimes over the course of a month or two. I focus on equity options, with a mix of equity positions. Over the past 5 months I’ve been primarily on the short side, although I have played AAPL, INTC, AMZN and DGP long trades. If I broke down the trades by dollar volume, it would probably be around 70% options (with about 15% index options), 15% equities and 15% ETFs.

On average, I’d estimate I’ve been putting in about 7-10 hours a week focused on the market and managing my trading portfolio. I typically start the night before by checking the stock futures on Bloomberg to help get a sense for what’s going on the next day. Next, I check after hours quotes on the stocks I’m following, as well as any new commentary that’s turned up on my StockTwits portfolio page. After that, I place my initial trades for the next day. Since the first 30 minutes and last 30 minutes of the trading day tend to be the time that market makers screw over the part-timers like me, I generally place my trades slightly outside the money, trying to snipe overreaction in sentiment one way or another. While this sometimes keeps me out of profitable trades, it also keeps me from some of the morning shenanigans. For the most part, this has worked in my favor.

The next morning about 90 minutes before market open, I take about 10 minutes to check the futures again and the pre-market quotes. About one in every ten or fifteen trades, I’ll adjust my bids/asks based on changes in conditions. That’s where I stand most of the day (on days I work) with occasional checks and adjustments over lunch or as time and schedule permits, occasionally checking my Twitter feed for any updates.

And the next night, it starts over again; hit my Twitter network, then the StockTwits main stream, then check in on the main blogs I follow for trading purposes:

• Howard Lindzon
• Upside Trader
• @mandelbrot’s Twitter Reality
• Buy on the Dip
• Brian Shannon’s alphatrends
• @fortune8’s Fade Me

There are about a dozen other blogs I kind of half follow (or catch up with on the weekends); but since I maybe have 30-45 minutes a night to review and get trades in, I can’t follow everything I want to (or should). Really, the crest of my Twitter network acts as the filter. Over the last 6 months I’ve come to see this as both a blessing and a curse. A blessing because I find good stuff I wouldn’t find otherwise; a curse because I tend to rely more on the network than on primary sources. And that costs.

So far, I haven’t set stops on my trades. Quite a few of my winning trades have been down 40% before turning around for gains. However, I think I can improve my return slightly with a couple of adjustments to this practice described below. The main reason I haven’t been setting stops is because of the extreme volatility; it seems like three times out of four, the trade will recover quite a bit from where I might typically set a stop. Because I can’t trade during the day, I almost always set an ask price outside the spread before the day begins and take it. I shoot for something in the range of a 10-20% gain, adjusting up and letting stocks run a bit if I have conviction. To a fault, I average down when I think my thesis is right but my timing is wrong. I talk about this a little more below.

And that’s it. I was lucky—really lucky— when I started in September in that I was making trades that represented about two to three units on AAPL and ran off a great streak that doubled my bankroll of sweep cash in short order. Believe it or not, I hit a streak of 15 winning trades right out of the gate (although some took a month or so to finally be closed out.) This came from a combination of tuning into AAPL’s volatility, going against Best Buy (BBY) per Lindzon’s blog posts and tweets, and trading a couple of other stocks I was already familiar with from my portfolio. I’ve come back down to earth since then, but I’m still doing okay, and tuning how I work.

I expect that a year from now I’ll have this workflow honed even further. Early on, I didn’t really have a notion of position size. Lacking discipline, I put too much at risk and lucked out in that it paid off. I didn’t pay much attention to beta-weighting or any kind of traditional balancing. If anything, I was successful because I took my trading account extremely short during an epic downturn primarily to hedge against my hold portfolio.

Workflow is important when you only have limited time. Since getting into digital photography several years back, and processing thousands of images, I’ve come to realize that when you’re learning, you go slowly and take many unnecessary steps and make unnecessary optimizations that just take time. With changing light conditions outdoors, you jack around with white balance on every shot, and adjust the unsharp mask on every shot. When learning, processing a series of 200 shots picking and finishing winners might have taken me 4 hours to complete. Yet after you’ve done a few thousand shots, you figure out what really matters and you can get through the same 200 shots in about 1/3rd to 1/4th of the time. I expect at some point, I’ll reach this with analysis. One key element will be always tuning the social filter.

Averaging Down

Last Sunday, fortune8 reminded me that averaging down is generally a bad idea unless you have a strong feel for an idea. Since I’ve started trading more actively over the past five months, I have enough data (113 trades) to see if that applies to me.

In the last 5 months, I’ve taken “initial positions” in securities 69 times, and averaged down on an initial position one or more times for 44 trades. Of those 43 trades, 21 turned out to be profitable, 12 turned out to lose, and 11 trades are still open. The net gain per trade on these trades is 9.69%. When I average down, 67% of the time I make money.

By way of comparison, overall I’ve made 113 trades with 66 winners, 26 losers and 21 trades still open with a net gain per trade of 7.86%. (For initial positions, I’m 45-14-10, with an net gain per trade of 7.38% with 76% wins.) Overall, that’s picking right 71.7% of the time.

Overall, I’m up a little over 6 “units” of my current average trade size. Until recently, I haven’t been that consistent on position size, in some cases going as high as 4 units, with most of the average-down trades on the order of 1/4th or 1/2 a unit.

Those numbers are eye-opening to me, even though I have no frame of reference. I think I saw that some systems assume that they pick right as little as 35% of the time, willing to take more losses to let bigger winners run (e.g., typical winner might be 2.5x the size of a single loss.) In theory, with such a system, you’d end up winning about 17% per trade over a course of trades.

The numbers I’m showing are about half of that in terms of return. And what comes to mind when I see that?

Poker. The classic amateur poker player is the one who’s the happiest guy at the table, pulling in the majority of the pots, winning almost every hand, frustrating other players as he sees each deal through to the river, grinding out low-return hands. And does that guy ever really win? No. The solid poker player lets the amateur harvest all those low return pots, content to sit back and play tight until it’s time to play loose and take the big pot.

Can I change my style and let my winners run? Is averaging down throwing money into a lost hand when you’re already beat?

At this point, I don’t think so. The data shows that for the most part, the primary difference between “initial” position trades and the “average down” trades is that the initial position trades tend to close out more quickly, and the average down trades tend to get more run. But in terms of success and return, there’s not a significant difference. In other words, for the most part, they should be thought of as independent events, even though psychologically, I tend to clump them all together, trying to “save the trade” as a single unit (e.g., referring to my “cost basis” rather than treating those as separate trades).

And maybe that’s the lesson: there’s no such thing as averaging down. Each trade is truly an independent event for a swing trader. Cost basis is interesting only for tax purposes. In trading, it’s simply a psychological construct that may inhibit appropriate decision making.

As I mentioned above, I go without stops and allow a lot of play when I have time. Based on the data above, I could probably improve my results slightly by setting a stop at something as crazy as 40%. Doing so would a) maintain my overall “initial position” winning percentage, b) cut my overall return slightly, but c) keep me “smaller” (as in too small to fail) by keeping me out of some of the long-running, large position trades. And in doing so, this might also allow me to get back to larger initial position sizes, which could make up for some of the loss in terms of actual trading units.

Focus on the Feel

The thing is: it’s not simple. Part of the reason I have so few trades is because I have such limited time. When I have a “feel” for a stock (e.g., AAPL and INTC), I can dial in and trade it with great success. Averaging down is a form of that, what I call “focus on the feel”. The areas where I’ve been killed have come from stocks outside the “feel” and in places where I shouldn’t have been. USO calls in the fall. The financials pretty much anytime. So cutting out the more profitable (but lower success rate) average down trades would be a bad thing if done on stocks for which I have a feel. But I could safely do so on stocks that are outside my comfort zone.

And this is all just a long way of partially agreeing with fortune8’s comment:

New People I’m Reading this Week

I haven’t done the StockTwits Saturday brunch yet, but thankfully we have @dakapbj’s great synopsis on Keep Unread.

Several times over the last seven years, I’ve purchased an AAPL product instead of buying the stock. Without fail, I would have been better off financially buying the stock rather than the device.

Tonight, I pre-ordered a Kindle 2.0 and the same effect may be at play, despite Amazon’s big run up since its lows.

The new Kindles aren’t available until the 24th, so that gives me a few more days to try to get back into my AMZN position that was called away at 50. The more I study Amazon, the more amazed I am at their strategy and coherency of vision.